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Research on speeded symbolic magnitude comparisons indicates that decisions 
are made more quickly when the magnitudes of the stimuli being compared are 
relatively close to an explicit or implicit reference point. Alternative explanations 
of this phenomenon are tested by seeking similar effects in nonspeeded rating 
tasks. In accord with the predictions of discriminability models, rated magnitude 
differences between stimuli in the vicinity of a reference point are expanded 
relative to differences between stimuli far from it. The inferred locations of cities 
along a west-east axis varies systematically depending on which coast, Pacific or 
Atlantic, is specified as the reference point. Scales derived from the rating data are 
correlated with the pattern of reaction times obtained in a comparable speeded 
comparison task. In addition, the distance between the cities nearest the locale of 
our subjects is subjectively stretched. Reference point effects are also observed 
when the form of the comparative specifies an implicit reference point at either 
end of a continuum of subjective size; however, these effects are very small and 
do not clearly support a discriminability interpretation. Stronger evidence for 
discriminability effects is obtained when an explicit reference point is established 
at an arbitrary size value. An implicit scaling model, related to range-frequency 
theory, is proposed to account for the influence of reference points on relative 
discriminability of stimulus magnitudes. The implicit scaling model is used to 
develop an account of how symbolic magnitudes may be learned and of how 
habitual reference points can produce asymmetries in distance judgments. 
Memory, it seems, is not a camera that faithfully records the products 
of our sensory experience; rather, it is a distorting mirror that reflects the 
shadows, subtly altered in shape, of what we once perceived. The trans- 
formations produced by memory are varied, but often systematic. Thus, 
we find that recall of stories is distorted in the direction of cultural 
stereotypes (Bartlett, 1932), that verbal labels influence the recall of pic- 
tures (Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 1932), and that recognition of visual 
patterns depends on their similarity to an unseen prototype (Franks & 
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Bransford, 1971). Memory transformations have also been observed in 
standard psychophysical judgment tasks such as magnitude estimation 
(Kerst & Howard, 1978; Moyer, Bradley, Sorensen, Whiting, & Mans- 
field, 1978). Furthermore, memory performance is determined not only 
by the information originally encoded, but by the manner in which that 
information is elicited at the time of its retrieval (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). 
Information in memory may be transformed by the very processes that act 
upon it in the course of answering a question or reaching a decision. The 
present paper focuses on transformations induced by the process of mak- 
ing judgments about remembered geographical distances and object sizes. 
SYMBOLIC COMPARATIVE JUDGMENTS 
Symbolic Distance Effect 
People have fairly detailed information stored in memory about the 
values of concepts on such continuous dimensions as size, distance, and 
duration, as evidenced by their ability to make psychophysical judgments 
about symbolic stimuli. Most research on the processing of subjective 
magnitudes has used a speeded comparative-judgment paradigm. Subjects 
are typically presented with a pair of symbolic stimuli, such as two object 
names, and asked to choose the item that is greater (or lesser) in mag- 
nitude along some dimension, such as size. A consistent finding, termed 
the symbolic distance effect, is that reaction time (RT) decreases as the 
separation between two stimuli on the relevant dimension increases 
(Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Holyoak and Walker (1976) provided evi- 
dence that the distance effect depends on interval properties of subjective 
magnitude differences, rather than just ordinal properties. Various 
theorists have suggested that symbolic magnitude is coded in memory by 
values with interval-scale properties and that these analog magnitude val- 
ues are compared to make relative judgments (Moyer & Landauer, 1967; 
Holyoak & Walker, 1976). The comparison process has been charac- 
terized as a sequential sampling procedure, such as a random walk pro- 
cess, that reaches a criterion more quickly for larger magnitude differ- 
ences (Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Holyoak, 1978; Holyoak & Patterson, 
1981; Moyer & Dumais, 1978). 
Semantic Congruity and Reference Point Effects 
A second phenomenon, termed the semantic congruity effect, involves 
the form of the comparative used in the instructions. Subjects are rela- 
tively fast to select the greater of two high-magnitude stimuli, while they 
are faster to select the lesser of two low-magnitude stimuli. For example, 
subjects can choose the larger member of a pair such as airplane-truck 
more quickly than they can choose the smaller, while the reverse is true 
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for a pair like moth-fly. While numerous specific models of the congruity 
effect have been advanced, these can be grouped into two broad classes, 
which we will term discriminabifity and nondiscriminability models. Dis- 
criminability models, as their name implies, assume that the comparative 
alters the relative discriminability of symbolic magnitudes. One general 
view is that the comparative specifies an implicit “reference point” at one 
end of the magnitude continuum and that differences between items with 
magnitudes close to the reference point will be more discriminable than 
differences between items with magnitudes near the opposite pole 
(Holyoak, 1978; Jamieson & Petrusic, 1975). 
The reference point explanation of the congruity effect suggests that 
comparable variations in relative discriminability might be produced by 
explicit reference points. To test this hypothesis, Holyoak (1978) timed 
subjects as they decided which of two digits was closer in magnitude to a 
third (the reference digit). In addition to a distance effect, an effect of 
nearness to the reference digit was observed. Holding the pair constant, 
RT increased with distance to the reference digit (e.g., subjects could 
select the closer member of the pair 3-4 more quickly when the reference 
digit was 6 rather than 7). Like the congruity effect, this result can be 
interpreted as evidence that discriminability is increased in the region of a 
reference point. In general, RT in Holyoak’s experiments was a linear 
function of the ratio of the closer to the further of the two distances being 
compared. This ratio measure is sensitive to both the distance between 
the two items and their overall distance from the reference stimulus. 
Other studies have also yielded evidence suggesting increased dis- 
criminability of magnitudes in the vicinity of a reference point for such 
diverse stimuli as geographical locations (Baum & Jonides, 1979; Evans 8z 
Pezdek, 1980), color concepts (te Linde & Paivio, 1979), and semantic 
categories (Hutchinson & Lockhead, 1977). The assumption that values 
close to a reference point are relatively discriminable has also been em- 
bodied in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) “prospect theory” of eco- 
nomic choice behavior. 
Reference Points in Nonspeeded Judgments 
The results of the above RT experiments, while consistent with the 
hypothesis that discriminability is increased in the region of a reference 
point, do not rule out alternative explanations. If the discriminability of 
the difference between a pair of stimuli is indeed affected by the form of 
the instructions, then it should be possible to find congruity and reference 
point effects with unspeeded rating tasks. For example, suppose a person 
is presented with a pair of cities located in the western United States and 
is asked to rate how much closer one is than the other to the Pacific or the 
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Atlantic Ocean. Discriminability models predict that in this example the 
rated distance will be greater when the Pacific, rather than the Atlantic, is 
specified as the reference point (since the cities are located relatively 
close to the Pacific). More generally, discriminability models predict that 
comparative judgments about stimulus pairs in relationship to a reference 
point can be described by 
where Rijk is a response related to the subjective difference between 
stimuli i and j with respect to reference point k; Si, sj, and sk are the 
subjective scale values of the two stimuli and the reference point, respec- 
tively; JI, is a monotonic judgment function associated with reference 
point k; andf is an increasing, negatively accelerated function. The effect 
off is to “expand” differences between stimuli close to the reference 
point, relative to comparable differences between stimuli far from it. Dis- 
criminiability models permit but do not require Jk to differ across refer- 
ence points. When Ri,jk is a response on a category scale, we assume that 
Jk will be approximately linear. If Rijk is a mean RT obtained in a speeded 
comparison task, Jk will presumably have a different form. However, the 
function f should remain constant across different types of judgment 
tasks. 
Nondiscriminability models assume that while the form of the instruc- 
tions may influence speed of responding, it does not alter subjects’ sub- 
jective impressions of the magnitude differences among the items. Such 
models predict that nonspeeded judgments will conform to 
Rijk = Jk(Si - ~j). (2) 
Equation 2 is a special case of Equation 1 that implies the reference point 
can alter the judgment function, but cannot transform the scale values 
nonlinearly. (Equation 1 reduces to Equation 2 iff is linear.) 
A few previous studies have obtained psychophysical judgments for 
the same set of stimuli with two different comparatives (Torgerson, 1960; 
Birnbaum & Mellers, 1978; Banks & Root, 1979). None of these studies 
reported any evidence of the type of reference point effect predicted by 
discriminability models. l 
’ Earlier work in social psychology suggests possible effects of reference points on 
nonspeeded judgments. Hovland and Sherif (1952) found that judges with extreme opinions 
made finer distinctions among attitudes close to their own than among neutral or opposing 
attitudes, as measured by a sorting task. However, this result is apparently fragile (Segall, 
1959) and dependent on the type of judgment required (Kelley, Hovland, Schwartz, & 
Abelson, 1955). Furthermore, any such effect might well reflect real differences across 
subject populations in the subjective similarities among attitudes. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was modeled after that of Birnbaum and Mellers (1978), 
who obtained judgments of relative “easterliness” or “westerliness” for 
pairs of U.S. cities. Seven cities that roughly lie on an imaginary 
east-west line across the country were selected. These overlapped with, 
but were not identical to, the set used by Birnbaum and Mellers. The 
cities were San Francisco (SF), Salt Lake City (SL), Denver (Den), Kan- 
sas City (KC), Indianapolis (Ind), Pittsburgh (Pitt), and New York (NY). 
Method 
Experiment IA. A design similar to that of Birnbaum and Mellers was used. One 
group of subjects rated all possible city pairs under two different sets of instructions. In each 
case subjects were asked to “write a number from 1 to 9 beside each pair indicating how 
much closer the first [or second] city is to the reference point than the second [or first] city 
is.” In the Pacific version, subjects were told to adopt as a reference point “an imaginary 
spot sitting a few miles off the PACIFIC OCEAN.” The Atlantic version was identical 
except that the Atlantic Ocean was specified as the reference point. In both versions a rating 
of 9 indicated that the nearer city was maximally closer than the farther city to the reference 
point. Judgments were blocked by form of the comparative, with the pairs listed in a differ- 
ent random order for each condition. The order of the two instructions and assignment of 
random order to instruction condition were counterbalanced across subjects. The two lists 
were presented to subjects in a single booklet. Subjects were told not to look ahead in the 
booklet, and prior to the second instruction condition they were advised not to “look back 
or even think back” to their previous answers. Each list included 42 items (21 pairs of 
different cities, each in two orders). 
A separate group of subjects rated the pairs under Neutral instructions, which simply 
asked them to rate how far apart each pair of cities seemed to be. In all three versions higher 
ratings indicated longer intercity distances. 
Eighty undergraduates completed the Pacific and Atlantic versions, and an additional 24 
completed the Neutral version. 
Experiment IB. To compare the reference point effects obtained in rating and RT 
paradigms, 14 additional subjects performed a speeded comparative-judgment task with the 
same city pairs. To make it less obvious that the critical cities formed a linear ordering, we 
added an additional seven filler pairs to the item set. These fillers were composed of 14 
different U.S. cities, including cities on the two coasts. None of these fillers was a critical 
city, and most of them fell off the east-west line defined by the critical cities. 
On each trial subjects judged which of two cities was closer to (or farther from) the Pacific 
or Atlantic Ocean and pressed one of the two response keys as quickly as possible. Each of 
the 28 basic pairs (21 critical pairs and seven tillers) was presented with both reference 
points, both comparatives (closer vsfarrher), and in both possible orders, for a total of 224 
test trials, which were preceded by 20 practice trials with different city pairs. Each subject 
received the pairs in a different random order. The stimuli were presented on a CRT screen 
controlled by a PDP 1 l/60 computer. On each trial the sequence of events was as follows. 
First, the reference point (Pacific or Atlantic) was presented for 1 sec. Then the comparative 
(closer orfarrher) was presented below the reference point. A fixation cross simultaneously 
appeared below the comparative. After a further 500 msec, the fixation cross was replaced 
by the city pair, centered horizontally on the position previously occupied by the fixation 
cross. The entire display (reference point, comparative, and cities) then remained in view 
until the subject pressed a response key or a time limit of 5 set was exceeded. If the subject 
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made an error, the word “error” was displayed for 1 sec. The next trial then began auto- 
matically . 
Results and Discussion 
Experiment 1A: Mean category ratings. An initial set of analyses was 
performed on the data from those subjects who completed the Pacific and 
Atlantic versions of the rating task. The mean ratings obtained for the 21 
pairs in the Pacific and Atlantic conditions are presented in Fig. 1. The 
horizontal axis represents the ordinal position of the more westerly pair 
member, and the lines connect pairs at each ordinal distance from 1 (adja- 
cent pairs) to 5. Discriminability models predict that cities in the vicinity 
of the reference pole will be rated as relatively far apart. The change in 




I I I I I 1 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
Westerly Easterly 
Ordmal PosItion of More Westerly City 
FIG. 1. Mean ratings obtained under Pacific (---) and Atlantic (- - -) instructions as a func- 
tion of the ordinal position of the more westerly city and of the ordinal distance between the 
cities (Experiment 1A). 
334 HOLYOAK AND MAH 
AS illustrated in Fig. 1, such interactions were indeed obtained. 
Analyses of variance were performed on the ratings for the Pacific and 
Atlantic conditions. Separate analyses were performed for each ordinal 
distance, and the predicted interaction between the pair locations and the 
reference pole was assessed by a bilinear trend test. These bilinear trends 
were highly significant for Distances 1 to 4, p < .OOl. Ratings increased 
monotonically with ordinal distance, p < .OOl. Neither the order of the 
cities within pairs nor the order of the two instruction conditions had any 
consistent effects on the pattern of results. 
Equation 2 can be rejected if the rank order of the rated distances 
differs systematically as a function of the specified reference point, since 
changes in JI, cannot alter the rank order. We therefore examined the rank 
order of the ratings given by each subject to the two extreme pairs at each 
ordinal distance (e.g., San Francisco-Salt Lake and Pittsburgh-New 
York for Distance l), under both Pacific and Atlantic instructions. Dis- 
criminability models (Equation 1) predict that more subjects will rate the 
westerly pair higher under Pacific instructions and the easterly pair higher 
under Atlantic instructions than vice versa. Nondiscriminability models 
(Equation 2) predict that the two patterns will be equally probable. (Cases 
in which the subject gives a higher rating to the same pair under both 
instructions do not differentiate between the two equations.) Binomial 
tests of these frequency counts supported the prediction of discriminabil- 
ity models at each ordinal distance, p < .05. The count at Distance 1, for 
example, was 17 subjects vs four. Equation 2 can therefore be rejected on 
the basis of ordinal violations that were statistically reliable across sub- 
jects. 
Discriminability models derive further support from scales of relative 
location constructed for each reference point condition (scales A and B in 
Fig. 2). The mean ratings for the 21 city pairs were fitted by a nonmetric 
scaling program, CONSCAL (Noma & Johnson, Note 1). The resulting 
A. Rx& ‘: 
B. Athtic ‘OF 
SF 
C. Amraged ) 
D. Neutral ‘P 
E Actual ‘r 
SL hl KC Ihd Pitt NY 
SL tkn KC hd Pat NY 
SL Dan KC lnd Pitt NY 
SL Den KC hd Pii NY 
SL L&n KC hd Pip NY 
FIG. 2. Scales of relative city locations based on: (A) Pacific instructions; (B) Atlantic 
instructions; (C) average of scales A and B; (D) Neutral instructions; (E) actual east-west 
distances. Scales A-D were derived from pair-comparison data (Experiment IA). 
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unidimensional solutions had stress values (Kruskal’s form 1) less than 
.02. A separate scale (D in Fig. 2) was derived for the Neutral condition.2 
All the scales in Fig. 2 have been normalized to a constant width. The 
Pacific and Atlantic scales clearly show the reference point effects dis- 
cussed above with respect to the mean ratings and frequency counts. The 
distances among the western cities are relatively expanded on the Pacific 
scale and compressed on the Atlantic scale; the reverse is true for the 
eastern cities. Note that the locations of all the interior cities on the 
Neutral scale, D, are intermediate between their locations on the Pacific 
and Atlantic scales. It is as if the two reference points had produced 
symmetrically opposite transformations of the Neutral scale. This impres- 
sion is heightened when we consider scale C, which was generated by 
averaging the locations of each city on the Pacific and Atlantic scales. 
This averaged scale is virtually identical to the Neutral scale. 
Scale E was derived by measuring the actual locations of the seven 
cities, as they project onto an east-west line, using a map of the United 
States. The distance between Salt Lake City and Denver is underesti- 
mated in scales C and D, while that between Indianapolis and Pittsburgh 
is overestimated. It may be more than coincidental that Ann Arbor, where 
our subjects were tested, is located between the latter pair of cities. In- 
terestingly, the subjective location scale reported by Birnbaum and Mel- 
lers reveals similar overestimations of distances between the cities 
nearest the site of their study, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois (compare their 
Fig. 4C and D, 1978, p. 407). These results suggest that residents of 
America’s heartland may not be immune to the type of distance distortion 
of which New Yorkers are commonly accused. 
The exaggerated Indianapolis-to-Pittsburgh distance in scales C and D 
may in part reflect the fact that all cities from Indianapolis on west-that 
is, all cities west of Ann Arbor-were displaced to the west on the subjec- 
tive scales. The Birnbaum and Mellers scale again reveals a comparable 
effect. Our subjects seem to believe that the Midwest is located entirely in 
the midwest of the United States, when in fact it extends into the 
mideast. 
Experiment 1B. The data from Experiment 1B allow a direct compari- 
son of reference point effects in rating and RT paradigms. Only the RTs 
for trials in which the question was “Which city is closer?” will be dis- 
2 In the case of the Neutral condition, an initial nonmetric scaling yielded a degenerate 
solution. Scale D was therefore constructed by a metric scaling procedure. This metric 
solution yielded a stress value less than .Ol when submitted to a confirmatory test using 
CONSCAL. 
3 The pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1A was also found in an experiment in 
which the three sets of instructions were administered to independent groups of subjects. 
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cussed, since the term closer was always used in the rating tasks.4 The 
overall error rate was 8.1%, and errors were positively correlated with 
RTs. The mean correct RTs for the 21 critical pairs, as a function of the 
reference point, the ordinal position of the more westerly city, and the 
ordinal separation of the two cities are presented in Table 1. The RT 
pattern generally resembled that obtained in many previous studies of 
comparative judgments. In particular, RT declined monotonically by 667 
msec as ordinal separation increased from one to six steps, and RT was 
relatively fast for pairs close to the reference point. The latter interaction, 
corresponding to the congruity effect typically observed in similar RT 
studies, was significant at Distances 1 and 2, with substantial trends ap- 
parent at Distances 3 and 5. Ordinal tests analogous to those performed in 
Experiment 1A yielded comparable outcomes. At each ordinal distance, 
the number of subjects with faster RT for the most westerly than the most 
easterly pair when the Pacific was the reference point, and vice versa 
when the Atlantic was the reference point, was compared to the number 
of subjects who exhibited the opposite pattern. As discriminability models 
predict, more subjects tit the former pattern (six vs zero at Distance 1, and 
11 vs zero at Distance 2, p < .02 by binomial tests, with nonsignificant 
trends in the same direction at Distances 3 to 5). Equation 2 can therefore 
be rejected as a description of the RT data of Experiment lB, just as in the 
case of the rating data of Experiment 1A. 
Our main concern was to determine the extent to which the different RT 
patterns obtained for the Atlantic and Pacific reference points can be 
predicted by the scales derived in the corresponding rating tasks (scales A 
and B in Fig. 2). We therefore correlated the differences between the two 
sets of intercity distances with the differences between the two sets of 
RTs (i.e., Atlantic distance minus Pacific distance vs Atlantic RT minus 
Pacific RT). If the scale differences predict the rank order of the observed 
RT differences across reference points, a substantial negative rank-order 
correlation should be obtained; if not, the correlation should not differ 
from zero. A significant correlation was in fact obtained, r, = - .67, p < 
.Ol. This result indicates that the influence of reference points on choice 
RT can in some measure be predicted from their influence on the relative 
discriminability of subjective locations, as determined in an independent 
rating task. 
4 The RT pattern differed substantially when the comparative farther was used, and the 
effect of the reference point was more complex. There were suggestions in the data that 
subjects used multiple strategies to answer questions with farther. For a discussion of 
alternative possible strategies, see Holyoak (1978, Experiments 4 & 5). 
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TABLE 1 
























Ordinal position of more westerly city 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1437 2595 2189 2026 243 1 2053 
1959 2717 2242 2297 1799 1541 
1314 1902 1581 1666 1873 
1750 2078 1583 1674 1195 
1530 1645 1733 1572 
1559 1701 1540 1317 
1455 1544 1415 






In Experiment 1 the subjects’ task always involved evaluation of the 
difference between a pair of stimuli with respect to a reference point. 
Would similar results be obtained if the task were to assess the value of a 
single stimulus relative to a reference point? Two of the previous studies 
that failed to find results comparable to those of the present study in- 
volved judgments about a single stimuli (Banks & Root, 1979; Torgerson, 
1960). Discriminability models, however, predict that judgments about 
single stimuli should conform to 
where Rgk is the response to stimulus i with respect to reference point k, 
andf is again an increasing, negatively accelerated function. The result 
will be a “stretching” of relative subjective distances in the region of the 
reference point, just as we have observed in the case of pair comparisons. 
Experiment 2 was performed to assess the role of reference points in 
judgments about the values of single stimuli. 
Method 
Subjects gave category ratings of the locations of U.S. cities on a 9-point scale. Seven 
filler cities (including one located on each coast) were added to the seven critical cities 
previously used in Experiment 1. Different subjects received the list of 14 cities in one of 
four different random orders. The instructions in Experiment 2 specified the reference point 
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in one of two different ways. One pair of versions asked subjects to judge how close each 
city was to either the Pacific or Atlantic coast. This explicit specification of the reference 
point locations is comparable to that provided in Experiment 1. In the other pair of versions, 
subjects were asked to judge how far either west or east each city was, leaving the location 
of the reference point implicit. In all versions a rating of 9 indicated that the city was 
maximally close to the implied reference point. This means that western cities were to 
receive the highest ratings under Pacific/West instructions, while eastern cities were to 
receive the highest ratings under Atlantic/East instructions. 
A total of 132 University of Michigan undergraduates completed the rating task, with 33 
subjects receiving each of the four versions of the instructions. 
Results and Discussion 
To examine the overall pattern of results, the ratings each subject gave 
for the seven critical cities were placed in the order of the actual city 
locations. The six differences between the ratings given to adjacent cities 
were then calculated and used as indices of the subjective intercity dis- 
tances. An analysis of variance was then performed on the rating differ- 
ences between cities to assess the influence of the reference pole 
(Pacific/West vs Atlantic/East) and the mode of specifying the reference 
point (Pacific/Atlantic vs West/East). The predicted influence of the ref- 
erence point was tested by a bilinear trend test. This trend was highly 
significant, t(640) = 5.26,~ < .OOl, reflecting the relatively wider spacing 
of cities near the reference pole. This effect was 64 units in magnitude for 
the two extreme adjacent pairs. The mode of specifying the reference 
point produced small variations in the overall intercity distances; how- 
ever, the influence of the reference point on the spacings did not vary 
significantly between the Pacific/Atlantic and West/East versions, 
F(5,640) = 1.01. 
The discriminability prediction was tested by a frequency count, as in 
the previous experiments. For each subject the rating difference between 
San Francisco and Salt Lake City was compared to that between 
Pittsburgh and New York. Under Pacific and West instructions, the dis- 
tance index was higher for the westerly pair for 71% of the subjects, 
higher for the easterly pair for 3%, and equal for 26%. Under Atlantic and 
East instructions the comparable figures were 32, 30, and 38%, respec- 
tively. These frequencies differ significantly in the manner predicted by 
discriminability models, x2(2) = 26.2, p < .OOl. 
Scales of relative location were derived by successive interval scaling 
(Bock & Jones, 1968), combining the Pacific and West data and the At- 
lantic and East data.5 The two resulting data sets were analyzed together, 
after inverting the response scale for the Pacific/West data. Equal disper- 
sions were assumed. Estimated scale values for the cities were normal- 
s The computer program used to perform successive interval scaling was developed by 
J. E. Keith Smith. 
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ized to a constant width, separately for each reference point condition. 
This procedure is equivalent to fitting a constrained form of Equation 3 to 
the data, which assumes that the judgment functions associated with the 
two reference points are linearly related to each other. The deviations of 
the observed from predicted response frequencies did not approach sig- 
nificance, x2(78) = 77.4, p > SO. Furthermore, the two resulting location 
scales were virtually identical to those obtained when the two data sets 
were scaled separately, removing the constraint on the relationship be- 
tween the two judgment functions. 
Scales F and G in Fig. 3 present the scales of location derived from the 
Pacific/West and Atlantic/East ratings, respectively. While Scales F and 
G are not identical to the analogous scales A and B (Fig. 2) derived from 
pair comparisons, they show the same basic phenomenon-a relative ex- 
pansion of distances between cities close to the reference point, relative 
to cities far from it. Reference points thus also appear to affect scales 
derived by the successive intervals method. 
Scale H in Fig. 3 (analogous to scale C in Fig. 2) was obtained by 
averaging the Pacific/West and Atlantic/East scales. Scale E again pre- 
sents the actual spacings for comparison. Scale H is somewhat less veridi- 
cal than scale C (or the Neutral scale D), perhaps because it is based on 
fewer data per subject; nevertheless, it shows a pattern similar to those 
apparent in the scales from pair comparisons. The distance from Salt 
Lake City to Denver is underestimated, and the distance from In- 
dianapolis to Pittsburgh is overestimated. A general tendency to displace 
cities to the west is also apparent. This westward displacement begins 
with Pittsburgh, suggesting that the overestimation of the In- 
dianapolis-Pittsburgh distance is at least partially independent of the 
overall westward shift, since both these cities were displaced to the west. 
The results of Experiments 1A and 2 thus both provide hints that subjec- 
tive distances between locations close to the locale of the respondents 
tend to be expanded. 
F. Pacific ? SL!&m KC I-d PM NY 
G. Atlantic ‘? 
SLLh KC Ind Pm NY 
SF 
H. Averaged I 
SLtm KC Ind Pitt NY 
E. Actual SF 
SL Den KC hd Pitt NY 
FIG. 3. Scales of relative city locations based on: (F) Pacific/West instructions: (G) 
Atlantic/East instructions; (H) average of scales F and G; (E) actual east-west distances. 
Scales F-H were derived by successive interval scaling from ratings of the relative locations 
of individual cities (Experiment 2). 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 applied the rating paradigm of Experiment 1A to com- 
parisons of the subjective size of objects. Reference points were manipu- 
lated by varying the polar adjective used in the instructions (smaller vs 
larger), as in previous RT studies (e.g., Jamieson & Petrusic, 1975). 
Method 
Subjects rated the size differences between pairs of object names under instructions 
phrased in terms of either “largeness” or “smallness.” Twelve object names were selected 
from the size norms provided by Paivio (1975). These norms give mean size ratings for each 
object on a 9-point scale. The 12 test items in order of increasing size were ant, moth, prune, 
doorknob, hairbrush, flute, lamp, eagle, goat, motorcycle, horse, and garage. The mean 
ratings of these items ranged from 1.04 to 7.96. All possible pairings of the 12 items were 
then formed and listed in a random order on a sheet of paper. The smaller object in each pair 
always appeared on the left. Subjects were then asked to rate the magnitude of the size 
difference between the items in each pair on a 9-point scale, with higher numbers indicating 
greater size differences. Two sets of instructions were used. One version included the 
following: “Each pair of words below names objects that differ in size. In each case the 
object named on the right is LARGER than the object named on the left. In some cases the 
right object is only a little larger than the left object, while in other cases the right object is a 
great deal larger than the left object. In the space beside each pair, please write a number 
from 1 to 9 indicating how much larger the right object is than the left object.” The second 
set of instructions was identical except that “smaller” was substituted for “larger” through- 
out, and the positions of the words “right” and “left” were interchanged. In each version 
higher ratings corresponded to greater size differences. Both versions included instructions 
to consider only the average or most typical size of each object and to base the ratings on 
“your intuitive feeling” of the size differences, rather than objective differences in inches 
and feet. 
One hundred thirty-eight Stanford University undergraduates completed the rating task, 
with half receiving the “larger” and half the “smaller” instructions. 
Results and Discussion 
The mean category ratings obtained in the two instruction conditions, 
plotted as a function of the ordinal size of the smaller member of each 
pair, are presented in Fig. 4. Pairs with ordinal differences of one, two, 
and three steps in the 1Zterm series are plotted separately. A very small 
congruity effect was obtained for these pairs. Subjects rated the size 
differences between small objects as relatively greater under the “small- 
ness” instructions, while they rated the differences between large objects 
as relatively greater under “largeness” instructions. The apparent 
monotonic trends were statistically significant for ordinal distances of 1 
(F(1,1360) = 5.15,~ < .025) and 2 (F(1,1224) = 15.5,~ < .OOl), but not for 
3 (F < 1). At higher distances (not plotted) the effect disappeared entirely. 
The obtained congruity effects were very small, reaching a maximum of 
.50 units at Distance 2. 
Frequency counts analogous to those of previous experiments were 
6- 
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FIG. 4. Mean ratings obtained under “smallness” (- - -) and “largeness” (-) instruc- 
tions, as a function of the ordinal size of the smaller object and of the ordinal size difference 
between objects (Experiment 3). 
also performed. At each ordinal distance from 1 to 3, the number of 
subjects in each instruction condition who gave a higher rating to the 
smallest pair was compared to the number who gave a higher rating to 
the second largest pair. (Pairs including the largest item were not consid- 
ered because they consistently yielded the highest ratings regardless of 
instructions.) While in each case the trends were in the direction predicted 
by discriminability models, the differences were small and did not ap- 
proach significance at any ordinal distance. Thus, in Experiment 3, unlike 
the previous experiments, Equation 2 cannot be rejected as a description 
of the data. 
As in Experiment lA, the mean ratings for each instruction condition 
were fit by a nonmetric scaling program (in this case MDSCAL; Kruskal, 
1964). For each data set a satisfactory unidimensional solution with stress 
less than .04 was obtained. The relative sizes of the 12 objects from each 
solution are given in Fig. 5. The two sets of values have been normalized 
by equating the scale values of the smallest and largest objects. Although 
the “smallness” and “largeness” scales show some small differences 
consistent with discriminability models, the reference point effects ob- 
tained in Experiment 3 can charitably be described as miniscule. 
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FIG. 5. Relative sizes of 12 objects derived from ratings obtained in “smallness” and 
“largeness” conditions (Experiment 3). 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 4 was performed to establish whether explicit reference 
points would have an effect on category ratings involving subjective size. 
Subjects were presented with word triplets, consisting of a comparison 
pair and a reference object, and were asked to judge how much closer in 
size one pair member was than the other to the reference point. 
Method 
Materials and design. The object names used in Experiment 4 were animal terms 
taken from the size norms of Holyoak and Mah (1981). These scale values were derived by 
successive interval scaling of rating data, and range from 0.0 to 10.0. Twenty-four basic test 
pairs (two sets of 12) were selected. Three triplets were created for each pair by varying the 
reference object. The three reference animals were either ah larger (for 12 of the pairs) or all 
smaller than both pair members and were selected to have size values approximately 1, 
2, or 3 scale units from that of the closer pair member. For example, the pair bobcat-canary 
was associated with the reference animals alligator, cow, and hippo. The size difference 
between the pair members was also varied. For the 12 basic pairs that were either smaller or 
larger than their respective reference animals, five pairs were approximately 1 scale unit 
apart, four were 2 units apart, and three were 3 units apart. 
The combination of 24 pairs, each with three reference animals, created a set of 72 test 
triplets in which the reference animal was either larger or smaller than both pair members. 
For such triplets a judgment of the extent to which one pair member is closer than the other 
to the reference point could be reduced to a judgment of the size difference between the pair 
members. To make it less likely that such a strategy would be used, 18 additional triplets 
were added, in which one pair member was smaller than the reference animal and the other 
was larger. The ratings given to these filler items were not analyzed. 
The 90 triplets were listed in a booklet, with 15 triplets on each page. Four different 
random orders were used for different subjects. A pair was presented no more than once, 
with one reference animal, on any given page. Each triplet was presented on a single 
horizontal line. The two pair members, separated by a hyphen, appeared at the left margin, 
and the name of the reference animal was presented near the center of the page. The left pair 
member was always the closer in size to the reference object. 
Procedure and subjects. The written instructions included the following: “The 
third animal in each item should be regarded as a reference point to which the first two 
animals will be compared. In particular, the FIRST animal in each comparison pair is closer 
in size to the reference point animal than the SECOND animal is. Your task is to decide how 
much closer to the reference point the FIRST animal is.” Subjects were told to use a 9-point 
rating scale, with a rating of 9 indicating the first animal was maximally closer than the 
second to the reference point. Fifty-three University of Michigan undergraduates served as 
paid subjects. 
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Results and Discussion 
If subjects compared distances to the reference point, and these dis- 
tances are more discriminable when the pair is relatively close to the 
reference point, then the ratings should tend to decrease as distance to the 
reference point is increased. This result was in fact obtained, with mean 
ratings of 5.53, 5.04, and 4.75 for reference points 1, 2, and 3 units, 
respectively, away from the closer pair member. This effect of the refer- 
ence point was significant treating both subjects and items as random 
effects (Clark, 1973), F’(2,103) = 16.5, p < .OOl, and it did not vary 
systematically with the size difference between pair members or with the 
size of the reference point relative to the pair members. The size differ- 
ence between the pair members also had a strong effect on the mean 
ratings, which increased from 4.27 to 6.10 as the size difference increased 
from one to three units. 
It is unlikely that the observed reference point effects can be described 
by Equation 2. Since the comparison pairs were held constant as the 
reference stimuli were varied, the influence of the reference point cannot 
be attributed to variations in either the absolute size of the comparison 
stimuli or in their size differences. Furthermore, distance to the reference 
stimulus was not confounded with its absolute size, since the reference 
animals at each distance spanned comparable broad size ranges. The 
observed influence of reference points on the ratings appears to depend 
on the relationship between the magnitude of the reference point and the 
magnitudes of the stimuli being compared, as Equation 1 implies. 
Summary 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Nonspeeded judgments of the subjective magnitudes of symbolic 
stimuli can be influenced by the reference point with respect to which the 
judgments are made. Magnitude differences between stimuli in the vicin- 
ity of the reference point are expanded relative to differences between 
stimuli far from the point. Judgments concerning the locations of cities 
along a west-east axis depended on which coast, Pacific or Atlantic, was 
specified as the reference point (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, 
scales derived from the rating data were significantly correlated with the 
pattern of RTs obtained in a speeded comparison task in which the refer- 
ence point was also varied (Experiment 1B). Similar effects on mean 
ratings were observed when the form of the comparative specified an 
implicit reference point at either end of a continuum of subjective size 
(Experiment 3); however, these effects were very small and did not 
clearly support a discriminability interpretation. Stronger evidence for 
discriminability effects was obtained when an explicit reference point was 
established at an arbitrary size value (Experiment 4). 
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Boundary Conditions on Discriminability Effects 
Previous studies investigating nonspeeded judgments have not found 
evidence that reference points influence discriminability. In contrast, the 
present experiments, with the exception of Experiment 3, yielded clear 
positive results. We therefore need to consider the conditions under 
which discriminability effects apparently are or are not obtained. The 
Torgerson (1960) and Banks and Root (1979) studies both involved judg- 
ments about perceptual stimuli. It is possible that reference points have a 
greater influence on discriminability in symbolic than in perceptual tasks. 
It is more surprising that the study by Birnbaum and Mellers (1978) 
yielded no hint of discriminability effects, since their stimuli and proce- 
dure were very similar to those of our Experiment 1A. Bimbaum and 
Meller’s data were highly reliable, yielded a location scale closely resem- 
bling our Neutral scale, and conformed to Equation 2. The discrepancy 
between the two sets of results may depend on subtle variations in the 
instructions. In the conditions most comparable to our own, Birnbaum 
and Mellers’ subjects evaluated “differences” of either westerliness or 
easterliness. In contrast, our instructions never explicitly mentioned 
“differences”; rather, subjects were simply asked to rate “how much 
closer” to the reference point one city is than the other. Perhaps an em- 
phasis on “differences” may dispose subjects to attend directly to the 
difference between the subjective locations of the two cities, rather than 
to their locations relative to the reference point. If so, the subjects’ judg- 
ment process would follow Equation 2. Equation 1, derived from dis- 
criminability models, can be viewed as an extension of Equation 2, which 
is based on the subtractive theory of psychophysical judgment (Birnbaum 
& Veit, 1974; Veit, 1978). Equation 1 differs only in that each stimulus- 
to-reference-point distance is monotonically transformed prior to the 
subtraction operation. If a reference point is not provided or is ignored, or 
if the function f is linear, then Equation 1 will reduce Equation 2 as a 
special case. The data from our Neutral condition suggest that subjects 
are quite capable of evaluating location differences without comparison to 
a reference point. 
The rating differences obtained in Experiment 3, in which reference 
points were manipulated by varying the comparative used in the instruc- 
tions, seem too small to account fully for the congruity effects typically 
produced in RT tasks. Discriminability effects may be more pronounced 
for judgments based on linear arrays, in which the enditems provide sa- 
lient polar reference points (Holyoak & Patterson, 1981). Research in this 
area has tended to focus on “single-factor” explanations of congruity ef- 
fects within particular paradigms. Congruity effects, however, may be 
due to multiple factors, and their relative importance may vary across 
stimulus continua and experimental procedures. 
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Implicit Scaling Model of Reference Point Effects 
What process model might account for the influence of reference points 
on discriminability? Most previous comparison models assume that vari- 
ations in the form of the instructions do not influence the relative dis- 
criminability of the stimuli, but rather any of a variety of other processes 
such as encoding the items, retrieving their memory representations, 
translating semantic codes, or executing a response (Marschark & Paivio, 
1979; Moyer & Dumais, 1978; Banks, Fujii, & Kayra-Stuart, 1976; Banks 
& Root, 1979). A discriminability model might assume that a reference 
point causes the subject to selectively attend to the region of the mag- 
nitude continuum in its vicinity; due to more efficient processing in the 
favored region of the scale, items with magnitudes similar to that of the 
reference point would be compared relatively quickly (Hutchinson & 
Lockhead, 1977). This type of differential attention model, however, has 
not been formulated very precisely; furthermore, one variant assumes the 
subject will quickly “readjust” to the range of the presented stimuli, in 
which case discriminability effects would not be expected in nonspeeded 
tasks (Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer, & Feinstein, 1978). 
Yet a further approach would be to assume that for each continuum 
people code items on two magnitude scales in long-term memory (e.g., 
both “easterliness” and “westerliness” for cities) and that the items will 
be spaced differently on each scale. However, such a model does not 
provide a satisfactory account of the effects of explicit reference points, 
since it would be necessary to invoke a new scale to account for the 
facilitated processing of items in the vicinity of every arbitrary reference 
point. A more promising tack is to develop a model based on the premise 
that only a single set of scale values is stored in long-term memory, which 
can be transformed in working memory due to the influence of a reference 
point. One version of such a model assumes that subjects are implicitly 
assessing the ratio of the lesser to the greater difference between a 
stimulus item and a reference point (Jamieson & Petrusic, 1975). If sub- 
jective continua are represented psychologically as interval scales, then 
such judgments about ratios of differences (unlike direct judgments of 
magnitude ratios) are both conceptually meaningful and empirically pos- 
sible (Hagerty & Birnbaum, 1978; Veit, 1978). 
But while several studies have found that RT is a linear function of the 
ratio of differences (e.g., Holyoak, 1978), this result is not always ob- 
tained (te Linde & Paivio, 1979). The ratio of differences is equivalent to a 
very specific form of Equation 1, in which f is logarithmic and Jk is 
exponential. Observed response patterns sometimes strain this form of 
the equation. In particular, if one of the items in a pair is located at the 
specified reference point, the magnitude of the farther item should not 
influence either choice RT or distance ratings, since the ratio of differ- 
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ences will always be zero. However, distance effects are sometimes ob- 
tained even for pairs that include a congruent enditem. The model could 
assume the reference points are more extreme than any items in the test 
set (cf. Holyoak, 1978, footnote 2). However, in Experiment 1A one 
would have expected the subjective positions of the two reference points 
(the coastlines) to have been virtually identical with the positions of the 
two extreme cities. The distance of the farther city should therefore have 
had little or no effect for pairs that included the city located on the 
specified coast; but in fact, the mean ratings showed a large monotonic 
increase. It therefore seems preferable to develop a model consistent with 
the general form of Equation 1, which can account for the data pattern 
associated with the ratio of differences as a special case. 
An implicit scaling model can be used to derive Equation 1. There is 
abundant evidence that category ratings are influenced by contextual ef- 
fects, as well as by the psychophysical function for the stimuli. Range- 
frequency theory (Parducci, 1965; Parducci & Perrett, 1971) predicts cat- 
egory judgments as a weighted sum of the psychophysical function and 
the cumulative density function of the stimulus distribution on the mag- 
nitude continuum. Subjects tend to place their category boundaries closer 
together in those regions of the magnitude range in which the greatest 
numbers of items are presented. 
A model incorporating similar assumptions can be formulated to ex- 
plain reference point effects. Suppose that the comparison process in a 
choice RT paradigm involves implicit category scaling. That is, the sub- 
ject will recode the magnitude value of each item, retrieved from long- 
term memory, into a value on an internal category scale, which will then 
be available in working memory. (This implicit scale may be limited to 7 + 
2 values, as suggested by Miller, 1956, in his review of work on absolute 
judgment.) These category values are assumed to have interval-scale 
properties, so that the difference between the values for a pair of items 
can be assessed using the type of sequential sampling process postulated 
by analog comparison models. 
To account for the influence of reference points on relative discrimina- 
bility, the implicit scaling model asssumes that the width of the categories 
on the internal scale will increase with distance from a reference point. As 
a result, implicit category scaling will in effect transform the underlying 
continuum, stretching the perceived distances between stimuli in the vi- 
cinity of a reference point relative to distances between stimuli far from it. 
This mechanism corresponds to the functionf in Equations 1 and 3. The 
resulting variations in relative discriminability will influence judgments in 
an overt category rating task, so that reference point effects will be ob- 
tained with nonspeeded as well as speeded judgments. 
The implicit scaling model seems to provide a reasonable account of all 
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the present results. In particular, the model can accommodate the ob- 
served variations in the magnitude of reference point effects. The precise 
form of the scale transformation effected by a reference point may depend 
on a variety of factors. If for whatever reason the implicit scaling process 
is not influenced by a reference point, the model predicts that the re- 
sponse pattern will reduce to Equation 2, in accord with the psychophysi- 
cal theory of Birnbaum (1978) and Veit (1978). The model suggests that 
distributional effects could be obtained in symbolic comparison tasks. For 
example, the same items should be more discriminable when presented in 
an item set that spans a narrow rather than a broad magnitude range, a 
prediction for which there is some evidence (Hinrichs, Yurko, & Hu, 
1981). Finally, the proposal is readily compatible with the type of analog 
comparison process that many theorists have advocated. 
Magnitude Codes in Long-Term and Working Memory 
The implicit scaling model assumes that symbolic magnitudes are coded 
on a coarse-grained interval scale in working memory, but on a relatively 
fine-grained interval scale in long-term memory. But if magnitude values 
in working memory are relatively limited in their resolution, what use is 
there in having more precise values stored in long-term memory? Also, 
how can such relatively precise values ever be learned? In general, why is 
working memory not a “bottleneck” that limits the resolution of mag- 
nitude information being stored in or retrieved from long-term memory 
(cf. Banks, 1977)? 
The solutions to these twin puzzles are essentially the same, namely, 
the introcution of sequential sampling mechanisms. Consider first the 
process of retrieving symbolic magnitudes, as is required in a relative 
judgment task. The implicit scaling model, like other analog models, as- 
sumes that the comparison process involves an iterative process of re- 
trieving magnitude values for the two items, recoding them into working 
memory, and assessing the difference between them (Holyoak & Patter- 
son, 1981). While on each cycle of this process the available magnitude 
codes for the two items will be relatively coarse grained, over ;-;peated 
iterations the estimated difference between them will become more pre- 
cise. For example, suppose a person is asked to decide which is larger, an 
ant or a pea. On any given cycle the two items may receive identical 
magnitude codes in working memory. If the size values associated with 
the two concepts in long-term memory are in fact discriminable, however, 
pea will receive a relatively high value on the scale in working memory 
more often than ant will. As a result, a random walk or similar sequential 
sampling procedure will in general eventually lead to a confident decision 
that peas are larger than ants. 
A similar sequential sampling mechanism can describe how subjective 
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magnitudes could be learned (an issue that has received little previous 
discussion). The first time an object (or member of a particular category) 
is encountered, a coarse magnitude value may be stored in long-term 
memory for any continuous dimension that is encoded. Subsequent expo- 
sures can then be used to revise the initially imprecise estimate. Just as a 
series of observations can be used to estimate the mean for a population, 
this sampling process will yield increasingly precise estimates of the mean 
magnitude value of the stimulus. In the case of a category of stimuli, the 
resulting representation may more generally take the form of a parametric 
description of the distribution of magnitude values for the category in- 
stances, as is assumed by the category density model of classification 
learning proposed by Fried and Holyoak (Note 2). 
This conception of the learning process suggests how subjective mag- 
nitudes might come to deviate systematically from the veridical values. 
The magnitude of values stored in long-term memory will necessarily 
depend on the values encoded in working memory each time the stimulus 
is encountered. It follows that if the codes in working memory are con- 
sistently biased in a particular way, the long-term codes will eventually 
reflect this bias. This suggests a link between two types of distortions 
observed in Experiments IA and 2. You may recall that in addition to the 
instructional effects produced by specifying either the Atlantic or the 
Pacific coast as a reference point, the data provided suggestive evidence 
that distances between cities near the locale of our subjects were overes- 
timated (as did the data of Birnbaum & Mellers, 1978). In terms of the 
implicit scaling model, the former effect reflects transient alterations of 
the discriminability of location codes in working memory, while the latter 
effect reflects a stable distortion of the subjective locations stored in 
long-term memory. When the learning process is considered, it seems that 
the latter effect could be a product of the former. If people evaluate 
relative locations with respect to the place they live, distances between 
nearby locations will seem subjectively larger than comparable distances 
between remote locations. If the same place is habitually used as a refer- 
ence point, this distortion will eventually be reflected in the “mental 
map” stored in long-term memory. Reference point effects may therefore 
reflect an ecologically important flexibility in people’s ability to distribute 
a limited discriminatory capacity over a given magnitude range. In the 
geographic domain it is usually desirable to make relatively fine discrimi- 
nations among distances between nearby locations. In most cir- 
cumstances the apparent corollary, that local distances are subjectively 
“stretched” relative to remote ones, is unlikely to have serious adverse 
consequences. 
Another possible explanation of the influence of habitual reference 
points, also consistent with the implicit scaling approach, is based on the 
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observation that people will tend to be familiar with more places located 
in the vicinity of their reference location than elsewhere. If locations 
serve as retrieval cues for nearby places, the subjective density of known 
locations will tend to be relatively great in the reference region. Range- 
frequency theory predicts that response categories will be relatively nar- 
row when placed in a dense region of a continuum; accordingly, an im- 
plicit scaling process might stretch the subjective distances between loca- 
tions in the reference region. The density factor could also account for the 
consistent underestimation of the distance between Salt Lake City and 
Denver that we observed in Experiments 1A and 2. In the cognitive maps 
of our Midwestern subjects, little may lie between these two cities except 
for a narrow line of Rocky Mountains. (See Thorndyke, 1981, for evi- 
dence that intervening locations influence distance judgments.) 
Reference Points and Asymmetrical Distance Judgments 
The effects of reference points observed in the present study add to 
other factors that have been shown to distort judgments involving geo- 
graphical locations (Stevens & Coupe, 1978; Tversky, 1981). The appar- 
ent effect of an habitual reference point can be related to the influence of 
“landmarks” on the acquisition and use of spatial knowledge (Evans, 
1980). Sadalla, Burroughs, and Staplin (1980) recently demonstrated that 
habitual reference points (the most familiar locations on a college campus) 
produce asymmetrical distance judgments: an ordinary place is judged 
closer to a reference point than vice versa. This result parallels similar 
effects on similarity judgments obtained in nongeographical domains, in 
cases in which one stimulus in a pair is more “prototypical” or “promi- 
nent” than the other (Rosch, 1975; Tversky & Gati, 1978). 
The Sadalle et al. demonstration implies that judgments of remembered 
physical distances violate a distance axiom. An important question con- 
cerns the locus of the asymmetry effect-does it involve storage or re- 
trieval? If one location is a reference point and another is not, do people 
have two different interlocation distances stored in long-term memory? 
Or could there be a single subjective distance between the two locations, 
which can be transformed in different ways during the judgment process? 
The framework provided by the implicit scaling model is more compatible 
with the latter possibility. Consider a task in which subjects make a series 
of judgments about pairs of remembered locations, in each case evaluat- 
ing “how close A is to B,” so that B serves as the standard to which A is 
being compared. The implicit scaling model assumes that each distance 
judgment will involve recoding the location values of A and B, stored in 
long-term memory, onto an implicit category scale in working memory. 
On each trial the small set of possible values on this category scale must 
be distributed across the entire subjective stimulus range. Since a wider 
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range will yield reduced discriminability, the distance A-B will be rated as 
smaller if the subjective range seems relatively wide. 
We assume that the subjective range may vary from trial to trial and can 
be influenced by the range of locations called to mind by the two test 
stimuli, and especially by the standard, location B. By definition, an ha- 
bitual reference point is a location with respect to which many other 
locations have been coded. It follows that a reference point presented as 
the standard will be a better retrieval cue for other locations than will an 
ordinary place presented as standard. A reference point standard will 
therefore be more likely to trigger recall of some remote location that will 
increase the subjective range. It follows that the subjective range will tend 
to be greater when a reference point rather than an ordinary place is 
presented as the standard, so that the A-B distance will seem relatively 
small in the former case. An implicit scaling process could thus produce 
the asymmetries in distance judgments observed by Sadalla et al. 
While research to date has identified a variety of phenomena attribut- 
able to the influence of reference points on symbolic comparisons, a great 
deal remains to be learned about the processes that mediate these effects. 
The implicit scaling model, while closer to a working hypothesis than to a 
full-fledged theory, at least provides a tentative framework within which it 
may be possible to integrate various phenomena associated with reference 
points. The basic assumption of the model is that relative judgments can 
reflect not only information stored in long-term memory, but also trans- 
formations induced by the judgment process. The distorting mirror of 
memory need not deceive us, if we can learn how it is fashioned. 
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